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Abstract—This work considers the strategic situation which
arises when Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) coexisting in a
given geographical area have to decide whether to invest in new
radio access technology and whether to share the investment
(and the infrastructure) with other operators. We focus on
heterogeneous networks (HetNet) where MNOs add a layer of
small cells to their existing macro cells. We address such strategic
scenario by proposing a Mixed Integer Linear Programming
formulation of the infrastructure sharing problem which takes as
input techno-economic parameters as the achievable throughput
in different sharing configurations, the pricing models for the
service offered to the end users and the expectations on the
return on investment for the mobile operators, and returns
as output the ”best” infrastructure/investment sharing options
for the MNOs. The proposed formulation is finally leveraged
to analyze the dynamics involved in the infrastructure sharing
process under different techno-economic conditions in realistic
network scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have witnessed several technological
upgrades in mobile network technology, starting with the
introduction of 3G to the recent efforts on LTE-Advanced and
5G networks. Such rapid evolution in the mobile networks
ecosystem has led to two major facts: on one hand, it has
made possible for Over The Top (OTT) service providers to
enrich their set of offered services, and, on the other hand, it
has made the end users more and more bandwidth ”eager”.
As a consequence, the traffic to be delivered through mobile
networks is exponentially growing and the end users are more
and more concerned about the Quality of Experience of the
connectivity service.
This scenario often forces the Mobile Network Operators
(MNOs) to ”chase” technology developments and users de-
mands by frequently upgrading their network architectures. In
this context, the conventional model according to which each
mobile operator retains complete control and ownership of its
network shows some limitations due to the large and frequent
investments which are requested on the network infrastructure.
As a result, migrating to new generations of mobile systems
may lead to marginal profits or even being unprofitable for the
MNOs due to the mismatch between, on one side, the growth
rate and required quality of the mobile traffic and, on the other
side, the expected return of investment (ROI) [1].
Network infrastructure sharing among MNOs has been pro-
posed as a way to cope with the aforementioned shortcomings.
In this work, we focus on Radio Access Network (RAN)
sharing scheme in which MNOs may share at some level
their radio infrastructure while maintaining separation and full
control over the back hauling and core network infrastructures.
In details, we consider a scenario where multiple MNOs with a
consolidated network infrastructure, consisting of macro cells,
and market shares coexist in a given geographical area; the
MNOs have then to decide if it is profitable to upgrade their
RAN technology by deploying additional LTE small-cell base
stations and whether to share the investment (and the deployed
infrastructure) of the new small-cells with other operators.
We address such strategic problem by providing a Mixed
Integer Linear Programming (MILP) formulation for the RAN
infrastructure sharing problem which returns the ”best” infras-
tructure sharing configurations among operators when varying
techno-economic parameters as the achievable throughput in
different sharing configurations, the pricing models for the
service offered to the users and the expectations on the
return on investment for the mobile operators. The proposed
formulation is then leveraged to analyze the impact of the
aforementioned parameters/input in a realistic mobile network
environment.
The manuscript is organized as follows: Sec. II reviews the
mainstream literature in the field of infrastructure sharing high-
lighting the main novelties of the proposed approach. In Sec.
III, we introduce the reference scenario describing the techno-
economic parameters involved in the infrastructure sharing
problem which is then represented in a MILP formulation.
Sec. IV applies the proposed optimization model to derive
insights in the strategic behavior of MNOs in realistic network
scenarios. Our concluding remarks are given in Sec. V.
II. RELATED WORK
Broadly speaking, there are two major research tracks in the
field of infrastructure sharing: (i) work dealing with techno–
economic modeling of network sharing and (ii) work on
practical algorithms on management and allocation of shared
network resources.
The first track includes mostly qualitative and quantitative
study of different sharing scenarios and models for estimat-
ing capital and operational expenditures. Meddour et al. [2]
suggest a classification of sharing scenarios; this work also
assesses technical constraints, suggests guidelines for MNO
involved in the sharing process and emphasizes the need for
subsidization and assistance from regulatory entities. Similarly
Beckman et. al [3] show that the role of regulatory entities is
crucial to avoid the decline of market competition; moreover,
the authors of [4] model the capital and operational expendi-
tures for different levels of sharing and suggest outsourcing as
the solution to the challenges posed by network sharing. The
work in [5] provides a benchmark-based model that delivers
high-quality cost estimates for alternative delivery options of
the MNO processes such as “regionalization”, “centralization”
and “outsourcing”. Vaz et al. propose a framework to evaluate
the performance of heterogeneous network deployment pat-
terns in terms of net present value, capacity, coverage, and
carbon footprint [6].
In the field of strategic modeling of infrastructure/resource
sharing situation, it is worth mentioning the work resorting to
game theory. Malanchini et al. [7] resort to non-cooperative
games to model the problems of network selection, when users
can choose among multiple heterogeneous wireless access,
and of resource allocation in which mobile network operators
compete to capture users by properly allocating their radio
resources. The work in [8] uses a non-cooperative game to
model the strategic decision of an MNO regarding sharing of
its LTE infrastructure in a non–monopolistic telecom market.
Another example of 4G infrastructure sharing is given in [9]
which considers sharing LTE access network femtocells with
other access technologies such as Wi–Fi. Cooperative game
theory is used in [10] and [11]; in [10], the resource allocation
problem in a shared network is formalized in a two step
problem: resource sharing among the operators; and resource
bargaining among the users and MVNOs of each operator; the
work in [11] considers not only sharing among MNO but also
among operators of different wireless access technology.
The research track on practical aspect of
resource/infrastructure sharing focuses on algorithms and
architectures for managing shared resources. The work in
[12] suggests that radio resource management is handled by
a third-party service provider or an inter-connection provider
to preserve competition and reduce exposure. The authors in
[13] introduce the Network without Borders (NwoB) concept
as a pool of virtualized wireless resources with a shared
radio resource manager. Along the same lines, Rahman et
al. introduce a novel architecture based on wireless access
network virtualization, where the key tenet is to offload
the baseband process from physical base station to backend
devices; in this way, the physical base stations can be sliced
into virtual base stations [14].
The aforementioned literature work either abstracts away
technical aspects related to the mobile network performance
to focus on more economic-oriented analysis and modeling,
or, the other way around. To the best of our knowledge, ours
is one of the first attempts to strike a better balance between
these two aspects of the sharing problem, by quantitatively
modeling the relation between technical issues related to the
radio communication at the access interface (area coverage,
transmission rate, user density and quality observed by users)
with economic issues (deployment costs and revenues) in
mobile network infrastructure sharing.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a set O of MNOs who have up and running
3G/4G networks with the respective customer sets in a dense
urban area. Parameter σi gives the share of users of i ∈ O
out of the total N users in the area. The MNOs may consider
investing to deploy additional LTE small-cells (HetNets). A
MNO can either invest by itself or share the investment (and
the deployed infrastructure) with a subset (or all) of the other
MNOs. S is the set of all possible coalitions that can be created
for the given set of MNOs (thus, |S| is equal to 2|O|−1). If a
MNO invests by itself, the coalition is referred to as singleton.
Os is the set of MNOs of a coalition s ∈ S , whereas Si the
set of coalitions i ∈ O can be part of. Each MNO inherits the
customer base from its current network, assuming that users
will not change their MNO but will potentially subscribe to a
new (LTE) data plan. The problem consists in determining the
subset of coalitions which are formed up by the MNOs and
the number of new small-cell base stations (BSs) activated
by each coalition. A maximum number of BSs Umax can be
activated by all coalitions in the given area.
The decision of the MNOs on whether to invest or not
is affected by the users’ response to the improved service.
Users are characterized by their willingness to pay for 1
Mbps of LTE rate on a monthly basis, δ, which alternatively
represents the monthly price of 1 Mbps. Moreover, such
decision is strongly related to the MNOs’ financial targets,
i.e., a minimum expected return on investment at the end of
the investment lifetime; if it is not achievable, MNOs do not
invest. We model such expectations through parameter γ which
represents the minimum monthly revenue expected out of a
single user in the return on investment. Since these targets
are set for the investment lifetime D, the investment costs are
calculated over the same period. Both capital (e.g., site and
BS acquisition) and operational (e.g., hardware and software
maintenance, land renting and power supply) expenditure
contribute to the overall costs of the infrastructure [2]. The BS
cost g is estimated according to Equations (1), with reference
to the pricing model in [15]: gcapex is the fixed CAPEX
component, whereas gaopex is the annual OPEX component
expressed as a fixed percentage (ξ) of gcapex. The cost of a
single BS for the investment lifetime D is the sum of the
fixed initial CAPEX and the accumulated OPEX during D.
The BSs installation cost of a coalition is then divided among
the coalition members.
gaopex = ξgcapex (1)
gopex = Dg
a
opex
g = gcapex + gopex
The decision of a MNO i to join coalition s or not is
captured by a binary variable xis, which equals zero if i
selects any other coalition in Si but s or when all MNOs
in s do not invest at all, as financial targets are not satisfied.
Binary variables ys to keep track of the selected coalitions:
ys equals one if all the MNOs in s select s and invest, and
thus s is activated. The coalition selection is modeled through
Constraints (2), which force each MNO to join at most one
coalition. Constraints (3) make sure that a coalition exists only
if all of its members agree to collaborate.∑
s∈Si
xis ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ O (2)
xis = ys, ∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ Os (3)
If coalition s is created, a certain number of BSs, repre-
sented by a non-negative integer variables us, is installed. If
coalition s is not selected or there is no investment (ys = 0),
the corresponding variable us is forced to zero by means of
Constraints (4). Constraint (5) limits the overall number of
BSs activated by all coalitions.
us ≤ Umaxys, ∀s ∈ S (4)∑
s∈S
us ≤ Umax (5)
We assess the quality of service provided by MNOs through
the average rate perceived by the users, being the latter an
important indicator of the users’ level of satisfaction. There
are three types of LTE user rate in our proposed model:
nominal user rate, coalition user rate and user rate per MNO.
The nominal user rate is the maximum achievable LTE rate
for a certain level of Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio
(SINR) and a given system bandwidth1 that a user perceives
when assigned all downlink LTE resource blocks from its
serving BS. The downlink SINR is a function of the number
of activated BSs by the coalition the user belongs to, since
a larger number of BSs results in the user being on the
average closer to its serving BS, and thus receiving a stronger
signal, but also closer to the interfering ones2. Thus, also the
nominal user rate of coalition s, represented by a non-negative
continuous variables ρnoms , is a function of the number of
activated BSs us.
The average rate perceived by a user in coalition s, ρs,
depends on the nominal user rate and on the load of its serving
BS and can be modeled by the following Equations (6):
ρs = ρ
nom
s (1− η)
∑
i∈Os σiN
us , ∀s ∈ S, (6)
where parameter η is the user activity factor, that is, the
probability that a user is actually active in his/her serving BS,
the
∑
i∈Os σiN is the total number of users that belong to
coalition s, and the ratio
∑
i∈Os σiN
us
is the average number of
users served by one BS. As a result, the nominal rate is scaled
down by the factor (1 − η)
∑
i∈Os σiN
us which accounts for the
average congestion level at a serving BS.
Assuming that a user that belongs to a MNO in a coalition
s can be served by any of the BSs activated by s, the average
user rate per MNO i, represented by continuous non-negative
variable qi, is equal to the average user rate of the coalition
joined by the MNO, that is,
qi =
∑
s∈Si
ρs, ∀i ∈ O (7)
1We consider a 10 Mhz bandwidth in our simulations whether the BS is
shared or not.
2Since we are considering nominal rate, any other BS transmission will use
a subset or all the resource blocks and therefore unavoidably interfere.
As for the investment cost and revenues for the MNOs, it is
reasonable to model the revenue per MNO i as a continuous
non-negative variable ri which is linearly dependent on the
MNO’s user rate qi, being the proportionality constant the
product of the monthly price of 1 Mbps δ, the investment
lifetime D and the number of users of MNO i, as shown in
the following:
ri = δDσiNqi, ∀i ∈ O (8)
The cost incurred by MNO i, represented by non-negative
continuous variable ci, is a linear function of the number
of installed BSs, divided among the coalition’s members
proportionally to their number of users. Equations (9) define
the costs for each MNO.
ci =
∑
s∈Si
g
σi∑
j∈Os
σj
us, ∀i ∈ O (9)
The following constraints (10) force the return on invest-
ment of a MNO i to be greater or equal than the product
of the monthly return on investment expected from the single
user γ, the investment lifetime D and the MNO’s user share
σiN , if i joins one coalition and thus invests.
ri − ci ≥ γσiND
∑
s∈Si
xis, ∀i ∈ O (10)
We investigate the optimal solution of the proposed model
(Equations 1-10) for 5 objective functions.
max
∑
i∈O
qi (11a)
max min
i∈O
qi (11b)
max (min
i∈O
qi +
∑
i∈O
qi) (11c)
max
∑
i∈O
(ri − ci) (11d)
max (
∑
i∈O
(ri − ci) + min
i∈O
(ri − ci)) (11e)
Objectives (11a), (11b), (11c) are user-oriented, since they
focus on the quality observed by the user, whereas (11d) and
(11e) are operator-oriented, as they focus on the return on
investment. However, even though the user-oriented objectives
prioritize the offered quality, by means of Constraints (10),
the MNOs financial targets for the investment are still taken
into account. Objective (11a) maximizes the sum of user rate
over all MNOs, whereas (11b) maximizes the smallest user
rate, so as to provide more fair solutions. Even though it is
against the realistic selfish behavior of a MNO to improve
the quality offered by another MNO at the cost of degrading
its own, such objective could be enforced by an external
regulatory entity that strikes a balance between the shared
investment and the quality perceived by the worst-served
users. Objective (11c) maximizes both terms, trying to avoid
solutions that advantage a subset of MNOs by disadvantaging
the others, while still maximizing the sum term. Similarly for
two operator-oriented objectives, (11d) maximizes the sum
of the return on investment over all MNOs, whereas (11e)
maximizes the sum of both factors.
It is important to notice the non-linearity of the right side of
Equations (6), due both to the behavior of ρnoms with respect to
us and the non-linearity of the load factor with respect to us.
The behavior of the nominal/coalition user rate with respect
to us is investigated by simulating the small-cell BS deploy-
ment (see next section). Objectives (11b) and (11e) are also
nonlinear due to the max min terms. A MILP formulation can
be obtained by applying suitable linearization/approximation
(see [16] for a detailed description the linearization). Tables I
and II recap parameters and variables.
Symbol Description Value
O Set of MNOs {A,B,C}, |O|=3
S Set of coalitions {A,B,C,AB,AC,BC,ABC}
Os Set of MNOs in coalition s ∈ S —
Si Set of coalitions MNO i ∈ O can join {s ∈ S|i ∈ Os}
N Total number of users in the area 20000
A Area size 4km2
σi User share of each MNO i ∈ O (0.25, 0.5, 0.25)
Umax Max. number of BSs in the area 1000
δ Monthly price of 1 Mbps {0.05,0.1,0.2,0.8,1,2}e/Mbps
γ User monthly return on investment {0,1,5,10}e
D Investment lifetime 120 months [17]
η User activity factor 0.001
ξ OPEX annual % 15 % [15]
gcapex CAPEX of BS cost 3000e [18]
g BS cost normalized for D 7500e
TABLE I: Sets and parameters, and corresponding values
Variable Description
xis ∈ {0, 1} 1 if MNO i ∈ O joins coalition s ∈ Si, 0 otherwise
ys ∈ {0, 1} 1 if coalition s ∈ S is created, 0 otherwise
us ∈ Z+N Number of BSs installed by coalition s ∈ S
ρnoms ≥ 0 Nominal user rate for coalition s ∈ S
ρs ≥ 0 User rate for coalition s ∈ S
qi ≥ 0 User rate for MNO i ∈ O
ci ≥ 0 Costs of MNO i ∈ O
ri ≥ 0 Revenues of MNO i ∈ O
TABLE II: Variable domains and description
IV. RESULTS
The MILP model has been implemented in AMPL [19]. It
has been tested on 24 instances, using CPLEX V12.6.0 as a
MILP solver [20]. All tests were run on an Intel Xeon dual
socket quad core CPUs @2Ghz. The average computational
time is negligible for the considered instances.
A simulation environment was set up to to derive the
coalition user rate, ρs, as a function of each possible number
of activated BSs by coalition s (us), i.e., from 1 up to Umax.
In details, the entire set of Umax BSs is uniformly distributed
in a pseudo-random fashion on the considered square area. 10
sample users are also randomly distributed over the area; the
downlink SINR of each sample user is calculated according
to Equations (12) for each value of us:
SINRs =
Pi
ls
(∑
j∈1..us|j 6=i Pj
)
+ Pnoise
, ∀s ∈ S, (12)
which provide the SINR of the sample user served by BS i
(from which it receives the strongest signal) from the us BSs
activated by coalition s. Pi is the signal power the sample
user receives from its serving BS, whereas
∑
j∈1..us|j 6=i Pj is
the one received from the interfering (non-serving) BSs. The
received signal power is determined according to the three-
parameter path loss model (transmitted signal power Ptx, fixed
path loss Cpl and path loss exponent Γ) defined within the
GreenTouch Consortium [21]:
Prx[dBm] = Ptx[dBm]− Cpl[dB]− 10Γlog(d[km]), (13)
where d is the sample user–BS distance. The captured
interference is then scaled down by the load of coalition s
(ls = 1 − (1 − η)
∑
i∈OsσiN
us ) since users are characterized by
an activity factor η. Pnoise is the white gaussian noise power
for the considered system bandwidth.
The calculated SINR is finally mapped to LTE nominal rate
(ρnoms ) according to a multilevel SINR–to–rate scheme [21].
A single value for ρnoms is obtained by averaging over the 10
sample users. An additional averaging is obtained by applying
100 iterations for each value of us. ρs is then obtained from
ρnoms according to Equations (6).
The instances consider a 4 km2 square area (A) populated
by 20000 users. In this work we considered instances with
three MNOs: A, B and C, which is quite reasonable for the
Italian (also European) telecom playground [22]. The users are
distributed among MNOs in a non-uniform way: B has 50% of
them, while A and C have 25% each. The upper bound on the
overall number of new BSs Umax is set to 1000, being this the
number of BSs for which rate saturation is reached; deploying
more BSs neither increases the user rate, nor improves the
MNOs’ return on investment. These features are common to all
the 24 instances, which differ for the key economic parameters,
δ and γ. The values of the user’s willingness to pay for 1
Mbps of service on a monthly basis δ were deduced from
the current pricing models of Italian MNOs: values {0.05,
0.1, 0.2, 0.8, 1, 2} e/Mbps are considered. The values of the
monthly expected contribution from a single user in the return
on investment were chosen intuitively to create reasonable
lower bounds on the return on investment: values {0, 1, 5,
10} e are considered.
Table I provides the value for all the parameters, whereas
Table III maps the notation used throughout the remaining
part of this section for the objective functions with their exact
definition.
Notation Objective functions
TOTQ max
∑
i∈O qi
MINQ max mini∈O qi
TOTQ +MINQ max
(
mini∈O qi +
∑
i∈O qi
)
TOTP max
∑
i∈O(ri − ci)
TOTP +MINP max
(∑
i∈O(ri − ci) + mini∈O(ri − ci)
)
TABLE III: Notation of the different objective functions
Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the selected coalitions and the
corresponding number of activated BSs for each tested in-
stance and for each objective. Although there are five possible
coalitions, only three of them occur in the results: a coalition
between A and C and B going alone (B,AC), denoted by two
numbers in the cell, the first one being the number of BSs
activated by B, the second being the one activated by the
coalition of A and C; the global coalition (ABC), for which the
total number of BSs activated by the big coalition is reported,
and the no-investment case, represented by blank cells.
Fig. 1: Coalitions and nr. of BSs - TOTQ
Fig. 2: Coalitions and nr. of BSs - MINQ and TOTQ+MINQ
Fig. 3: Coalitions and nr. of BSs - TOTP and TOTP +MINP
A vertical reading of these tables shows how the greedier
the MNOs, the smaller the chances that the investment is
actually performed (higher γ, fixed δ). Instead, by reading
them horizontally, it can be observed that when users are
more willing to pay for the new service (higher δ, fixed γ),
more BSs are activated: all the 1000 BS for δ ≥ 0.8 for the
operator-oriented objectives and for δ ≥ 0.1 for the user-
oriented ones. Thus MNOs improve the offered quality and
therefore ”reward” their users. For smaller values of δ (0.05,
0.1 and 0.2) more BSs are activated for the user-oriented
objectives compared to operator-oriented (e.g., for δ=0.05 and
γ=0, 627 BSs are activated by the big coalition under the user-
oriented objectives but only 186 under the operator oriented):
when there is not much revenue from users, MNOs limit their
investment, in order to maximize their profit. However, for
higher values of δ, solutions associated to different objectives
tend to behave similarly since higher revenues compensate the
costs of activating more BSs.
It is important to notice how for TOTQ the small MNOs
(A and C) collaborate, whilst B invests by itself. MINQ and
TOTQ + MINQ force the big coalition (Figure 2), so that
all MNOs provide the same quality to their users (thus, the
solution is fair to all MNOs with respect to the user rate).
The optimal solution for TOTP + MINP and TOTP
leads to the big coalition for any instance (Figure 3). This
result, even though rather counter-intuitive, shows how despite
varying δ and γ, when the financial targets are met, it is eco-
nomically more beneficial for MNOs to invest together. It also
shows how the sum term (
∑
i∈O(ri−ci)) of TOTP +MINP
dominates the min term (mini∈O(ri−ci) ) since the outcomes
for both objectives are identical. This is due to the non-uniform
user distribution which unavoidably leads to different revenues
per MNO and therefore different return on investment. Thus,
any solution that attempts to average out the revenue of a
single MNO would significantly reduce the overall return on
investment.
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Fig. 4: Average user quality vs. δ for each objective
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Fig. 5: Average return on investment vs. δ for each objective
Figures 4 and 5 show the behavior of the average user
rate (Qave =
∑
i∈O qi
|O| ) and the average return on investment
(Pave =
∑
i∈O(ri−ci)
|O| ) as a function of δ for each considered
objective and for two values of γ (0 and 5). When MNOs have
high expectations from their investment (γ=5) but users are
willing to pay very little for the new service (δ=0.05 and 0.1),
MNOs do not invest (represented by both Qave and Pave being
equal to zero). Instead, if MNOs lower their expectations, e.g.,
γ=0, they invest even if users are willing to pay very little
for the new service. The two families of objectives behave
differently for small values of δ (0.05, 0.1 and 0.02). The
Qave gap between the two decreases with the increase of
δ (it is approximately 30% for δ=0.05, 16% for δ=0.1 and
only 4% for δ=0.2). Similarly for Pave: the operator–oriented
objectives provide higher revenues with respect to the user-
oriented ones (99.7% of gap for δ=0.05, 51% for δ=0.1 and
only 9.5% for δ=0.2). As observed in Figures 1, 2 and 3 when
users are willing to pay more (δ equal to 0.8, 0.1 and 0.2)
the two families of objectives behave similarly, which is also
verified in terms of having the same Qave/Pave.
Figure 6 illustrates the behavior of the user quality (Q) with
respect to the return on investment (P ) for each MNO and each
objective when δ=0.2 and γ=5.
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Fig. 6: User rate vs. return on investment for each MNO and
objective
It can be easily observed that, for the selected instance,
the family of user-oriented objectives lead to higher user rate
but lower return on investment with respect to the operator-
oriented ones. Moreover, MINQ, imposed by the regulatory
entity, forces the MNOs to collaborate all together (outcome
ABC) guaranteeing the same rate to all users. In comparison
to TOTQ (outcome (B,AC)), MINQ improves the user rate
for MNO B (4.2% increase) at the cost of slightly reducing
the one of A and C (2.4% decrease). However, even though by
joining the big coalition MNOs offer the same quality to their
users, they can still differentiate their return on investment
according to their user share (i.e., MNO B has twice the return
on investment with respect to A and C for the same user rate).
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work analyzes the strategic situation in which MNOs
have to decide whether to invest in LTE picocell BSs and
whether to share the investment with other MNOs. We intro-
duced reasonable cost functions for the infrastructure sharing
problem, a pricing model for the new service and MNOs’
financial targets. We formalized the infrastructure sharing
problem through a MILP, which allowed us to investigate
the infrastructure sharing problem for different objectives and
varying techno-economic parameters concerning the user and
the MNOs. In details, two sets of objective functions were
considered: user-oriented ones, that prioritize users by aiming
to maximize the offered quality, and operator-oriented, that
prioritize the MNOs’ return on investment instead. The main
results of this study are the following: The MNOs’ decision
on whether to upgrade their RAN or not is simultaneously
affected by their expectations on the return of investment
and by how much users are willing to pay for the improved
service. The combination of very greedy MNOs with users
that are very little inclined to pay for new services leads to no
investment. If MNOs lower their expectations, it is possible
to invest and in almost all cases it is in both MNOs’ and
users’ best interest that all MNOs collaborate, that is, share
the infrastructure. The optimal solution behaves differently for
the two families of objectives when users are willing to pay
little; the user-oriented objectives, by focusing on the user rate,
merely satisfy the return on investment requirement, providing
higher quality for users, whereas operator-oriented ones limit
the investment, that is, fewer BSs are activated compared to
the user-oriented objectives, in order to maximize the return
on investment instead. However, when users are more eager
for new services, both families of objectives tend to behave
similarly. The proposed model can be further extended to the
case in which MNOs plan to simultaneously upgrade their
RAN technology in multiple dense areas. Moreover, spectrum
sharing can be naturally incorporated in the formulation.
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